Bin Laden

Bin Laden : An inconsequential Death


Introduction:
Global violence increased appreciably since September 11, 2001. By the lowest credible estimates, some 1.5 million Afghans and Iraqis have been killed since then as against about 3,500 persons on that day.  

Afghanistan invasion was explicitly launched to flush Bin Laden out, 'alive or dead' [George Bush the second]. Of the three main official lies for invasion of Iraq, one was Saddam Hussein's tie-up with Al Qaeda and involvement in 9/11 by implication. [Other two – myth of Saddam's weapons of mass destruction and the least believable - ushering democracy in the Middle East.] According to the American and global mainstream version and perception Bin Laden was directly or indirectly responsible for the wars.

The total time and cost of 'the war on terror' are a decade and at least a trillion dollars.

On the second of May this year, the American president announced that Bin Laden was killed without a single American casualty. 'Justice has been done'.

Implications of this death may be worth assessing. Not necessarily because the man was larger- than-life evil in the league of Hitler or Pol Pot [or Stalin or Mao depending on where you stand] but mainly because of his larger-than-life projection.

First of all, Bin Laden did not offer any constructive programme. And the act of killing him does not address, much less redress, the underlying causes behind his emergence. The causes include despotic regimes ruling the Arab World for decades on oil and/or western support, their corruption, regional backwardness, unemployment of the youth [almost 50% of the population], suppression of civil liberties, Palestine issue, and so on.



The immediate reactions:

New York and Washington saw ordinary Americans pour onto streets to 'celebrate' as soon he was declared dead, a sickening déjà vu of post-September 11th jubilation in the Palestinian territories. The low of collective human behaviour seems to be universal.

Now the morality of 'targeted killing' is being debated. We may never know if the raid was to capture Bin Laden or to kill him. If it was to kill him, no international law condones the act. That neither could Sept 11th be called legitimate is no argument. The US proclaims to abide by the rule of law - 'innocent until proved guilty'. That is why the outrage about Abu Ghraib, Guantanamo Bay or drone killings in Afghanistan/Pakistan.
As a presidential candidate, Obama had pleaded for prisoners' human rights. The change in position comes in conjunction with simultaneous acts of bombing in Yemen for Al Qaeda suspects and the attack on Libya. These interventions blur the ideological line between this administration and the last one.

The Players:

The US: At least three domestic reasons might explain the timing of the raid. Obama's perceived indecisiveness in domestic policy and ascent of the Republicans, the fragile state of the American economy and the forthcoming presidential elections. Patriotism/nationalism came handy as usual. Plus Bin Laden had become more a personal and symbolic than an ideological enemy. For example, authoritarian regimes like Saudi Arabia survive because of the American support. America could not contest this ideological position of Bin Laden.
Now with Bin Laden gone some senators have started questioning the very raison d'être of America's expensive presence in Afghanistan and Pakistan's worth as an 'ally'. Its nuclear capability may necessitate American involvement though.


Afghanistan:

It may be noted that there were clear signals in the early days of the invasion that Taleban wanted western help to get rid of Bin Laden. These fell on deaf ears probably because there had to be a spectacular retaliatory action befitting the spite of the US in the wake of 9/11. Reminiscent of that Taleban position, Karzai government responded with 'we told you so' when Bin Laden was found in Pakistan. Now sections of Taleban have started disowning Bin Laden, with an eye to the American withdrawal and return to power. Though ideologically desirable, the withdrawal is thus fraught with problems. Once Americans clear out, the nearby countries will step in, each for different reasons. China for natural resources; Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan [all ex-Soviet Union Muslim countries] and Russia for checking probable cross-border spill over of militant Islam through ethnic ties; Iran for increasing its reach and Pakistan for having a manageable neighbour.

Pakistan: Elected government is weak in Pakistan. Military-ISI [the spy agency] and Islamic fundamentalists are the main actors. The latter are making their displeasure known by taking to streets in protest against America [though anti-America feelings are not confined to these groups alone] and continuing at-times-suicide attacks against paramilitary, shias, ahmedias, christians etc. almost on a daily basis. American raid has humiliated the military-ISI combine. So far the corrupt business empire of the military was overlooked by people as it has been the only stable institution to hold Pakistan together and to counter India. Now it has been exposed to be inefficient and partially compromised as well. More than the Bin Laden affair, there is a sudden realisation in popular mind that their national pride - the nuclear installations - may not be in safe hands. Military was oblivious [or claims to be oblivious] about Bin Laden being in their establishment town for years. He had scant personal security implying reliance on local elements to protect him. This distrust is in addition to the continuing distrust of US-India.
A fair indication of the ingrained anti-India bias came out in a TV interview by the Pakistani Ambassador to the US. When the military detected the raiding helicopters in Pakistani air space over Abbotabad, they thought only of an Indian attack.
Estrangement from the US has pushed Pakistan closer to China for supply of new nuclear and military hardware, construction of ports, a rail-line through Pak-Occupied Kashmir, etc. Rather than reassessing the pre-raid domestic policy [training jihadis, protecting the Haqqani network that promotes Taleban] and foreign policy [meddling in Afghanistan, India] Pakistan is working on the same paranoid assumptions. How far China will entertain Pakistan's strategy to contain India or counter America is uncertain. All said and done, Pakistan is overwhelmingly dependent on American aid, not Chinese trade. Neither Pakistan-America nor Pakistan-China partnership bodes particularly well for India. America, China and India have different ideas about a 'stable' Pakistan. Nor does India have much clout.

The Arab World: Bin Laden came from this region, so too funding and recruits for the 'cause'. The west got an alibi to support dictators to check his influence. Now that rationale has gone, for one. Secondly, it may be difficult for a successor of Bin Laden's stature to take over the enterprise. Al Qaeda has now called upon mujaheds to devise individual tactics indicating a lack of central leadership. 'Franchising' of Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula [Yemen], Mesopotamia [Iraq], etc. may not mean much. Additionally, all the states in the region are now shaken up by internal dissent probably drying up the funding.

Conclusion: 'Legacy' of Bin Laden may be that he stood up to America on its own violent terms, at best a transitory euphoria for some in the third world. He re-invented the trans-national appeal of Islam. Nation-state can be and needs be challenged but on entirely different premises than obsolete religions. Main point however is that other than anti-Americanism he did not offer any vision for a better society. His egalitarian Islam would not recognise women's equality, it gave license to his followers to kill Muslims of other sects as apostates, alienating a large section. Muslim deaths in the name of jihad far outnumber infidels' who in turn became suspicious of all Muslims.

Geo-political realities show Muslims have cultural differences and are at different levels of consciousness to negotiate with market economies depending upon location.  Arabs, Persian Shia, Turks, Kurds, Muslims from India to Indonesia have hardly anything in common. If and when they are exploited, mechanisms of exploitation are different and may not have much to do with the West or they may be within Islam. This reality voids his pan-Islamic message of the Caliphate. His world-view was necessarily limited to the geography he came from and the grouse against judaism-christianiy manifest in the Palestinian cause.

That is why his death may not change much in world politics. Local grievances will continue to erupt, sometimes violently, sometimes in his name as long as social conditions do not improve.
However, the path of atomised violence under the name of pure Islam enunciated by him did not, does not and can not have mass appeal. The emotional and otherwise costs involved are too high for ordinary people and the ideology itself is bogus. This is seen both in the successful overthrows of the regimes in Tunisia and Egypt and in the on-going struggles in Libya, Syria, Yemen, Bahrain, Morocco, Algeria – all Muslim countries. Violent or not, fundamentalism has hardly been an issue towards reconstruction of these societies.
To conclude, there is really not much qualitative difference in the West's manipulation of the Muslim world and Bin Laden's. Both distort[ed] it with contempt, as colonies to be exploited - former for money , latter for faith.